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Ross: Eighth Amendment

EIGHTH AMENDMENT

ANDRADE V. ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA
270 F.3D 743 (9TH eIR. 2001)
I. INTRODUCTION
A large majority of states have enacted recidivist statutes
reqUIrmg increased punishment for repeat offenders. 1
California's controversial recidivist statute, the Three Strikes
and You're Out Law2 (the Three Strikes Law), was approved by
ballot initiative and enacted by the state legislature in 1994. 3
Defendants have challenged the constitutionality of sentences
under habitual offender statutes for at least twenty years.4 In
Harmelin v. Helm,5 the United States Supreme Court
addressed the constitutionality of a life sentence without the
possibility of parole for a first time drug offender convicted of
possession of 650 grams of cocaine. 6 Justice Kennedy's
concurrence in Harmelin set forth a three-part gross
proportionality analysis to be applied to sentences imposed
1 Andrade v. Attorney General, 270 F.3d 743, 762 - 63 (9 th Cir. 2001). At least forty
states have laws imposing harsher sentences on repeat offenders than first-time
offenders. See id., (citing People v. Riggs, No. E019488, 1997 WL 1168650, at *4 n. 2
(Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 1997).
2 The statute is officially known as the Career Criminal Punishment Act. CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 667,
1170.12 (West 2002).
3 Career Criminal Punishment Act, Stats. 1994, ch.12, § 1, adding CAL. PENAL
CODE § 667(b) - (i) and Proposition 184, § 1 as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8,
1994), adding CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12; Andrade, 270 F.3d at 747.
4 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 754. See generally Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980);
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983); Harmelin v. Michigan 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
6
501 U.S. 957 (1991).
6 Id. at 961; Andrade, 270 F.3d at 756.
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upon non-violent recidivists challenged under the Eighth
Amendment's clause prohibiting cruel and unusual
punishment. 7 In Andrade u. Attorney General,s the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied Justice
Kennedy's Harmelin analysis to a life sentence without the
possibility of parole for fifty years, imposed under the Three
Strikes Law on a non-violent recidivist who stole nme
videotapes worth under $200 on two separate occasions. 9
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. FACTS AND HISTORY OF THE CASE
Appellant Leandro Andrade's criminal history, prior to his
convictions appealed from in this case, included a series of
convictions for non-violent crimes, totaling five felonies and two
misdemeanors,lO beginning in 1982 with a conviction for
misdemeanor theft.l1 One year later, Andrade was convicted
for three counts of first degree residential burglary,12 a serious
or violent felony under the Three Strikes Law. In 1988 and
1990, Andrade was convicted in federal court on two separate
felony charges for transportation of marijuana. 13 In 1990, prior
to the marijuana conviction, Andrade was convicted for petty
theft.1 4 In 1991, Andrade received a parole violation for
escaping from federal prison. 15

7 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 756. Justice Kennedy's analysis requires examination of:
"(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences
imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for
commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions." Id.; Solem, 463 U.S. at
292.
8 270 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 2001).
9 Id. at 746, 749.
10 Id. at 749.
11 Id. at 748.
While the State excluded this conviction from it's summary of
Andrade's criminal history, the conviction was in the preliminary report relied on by
the sentencing court during the sentencing phase of Andrade's trial. Id. at 748 n. 3.
12 Id. at 749.
13 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 748 - 49.
14 Id. at 749. Petty theft is classified as a misdemeanor under the California Penal
Code. CAL. PENAL CODE § 490 (West 2002).
15 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 749. Under the California Penal Code, escape from prison
is punishable by up to six years in prison. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 4530, 4532. Escape
from federal prison where the underlying confinement is for a felony conviction is
punishable by a maximum of five years in prison plus a fine. 18 U.S.C. § 751(a) (2002).
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In 1996, Andrade was sentenced to life in prison, with the
possibility of parole after serving a minimum of 50 years, for
shoplifting nine videotapes worth a total of $153.54 from two
different K-mart stores on two different occasions.1 6 The first
incident, on November 4, 1995, involved Andrade stuffing five
videotapes, worth $84.70, into his pants.17 Two weeks later,
Andrade shoplifted four videotapes valued at $68.84.18
Generally, such offenses are treated as petty theft, a
misdemeanor, which carries a maximum penalty of six months
in county jail and a $1,000 fine. 19 However, based on
Andrade's status as a non-violent recidivist, the prosecutor
chose20 to charge Andrade's petty thefts with priors21 as
felonies triggering California's Three Strikes Law. 22 The
elevated misdemeanors constituted Andrade's third and fourth
strikes,23 while his 1983 burglary convictions served as his first
and second strikes. 24
In a bifurcated trial, the jury convicted Andrade on both
counts of petty theft with a prior. 25 In the second phase of the
trial, the court sentenced Andrade to two consecutive terms of
twenty-five years to life. 26 Andrade appealed his sentence to
the California Court of Appeal. 27 The California Court of
Appeal affirmed, rejecting Andrade's Eighth Amendment
argument. 28 The California Supreme Court denied review. 29

17

[d. at 746, 749.
[d. at 749.

18

[d.

16

[d. at 748. ·Petty theft is punishable by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars
($1,000), or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding six months, or both."
CAL. PENAL CODE § 490 (West 2002).
20 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 748. The decision to charge petty theft with a prior or as a
misdemeanor rests in the discretion of the prosecutor. People v. Superior Court
(Alvarez) 14 Ca1.4th 968, 976 (1997). The trial court has reviewable discretion to reduce
the wobbler offense to a misdemeanor at sentencing. Andrade, 270 F.3d at 749. The
trial court's discretion to reduce the charge to a misdemeanor at sentencing was not
eliminated by the Three Strikes Law. [d.; Alvarez, 14 Ca1.4th at 979.
21 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 749.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 666 authorized elevation of
Andrade's current convictions to petty theft with a prior, a ·wobbler" offense, because of
Andrade's 1990 misdemeanor theft conviction. [d.
22 [d. at 749.
23 [d.
19

24

25

[d.
[d.

Andrade, 270 F.3d at 749.
[d. at 750.
28 [d.
The court rejected Andrade's argument that his sentence constituted cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eight Amendment. [d.
26

27
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Subsequently, Andrade filed a habeas corpus petition in
federal district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 30 The
district court denied Andrade's petition on February 19, 1999. 31
Twenty-five days later, Andrade placed a Motion for Order
Extending Time for Appeal in the prison mail system seeking a
sixty-day extension to file his notice of appeal. 32 The district
court denied Andrade's motion. 33 Fifty days after the entry of
the district court judgment, Andrade placed a Notice of Appeal
in the prison mail system. 34 The district court denied Andrade
a certificate of appealability.35 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted Andrade a certificate of
appealability as to his Eight Amendment claim. 36

B. BACKGROUND: CALIFORNIA'S THREE STRIKES LAW
In 1994, the legislature and the voting public enacted
California's "Three Strikes and You're Out Law" ("the Three
Strikes Law").37 The law's purpose is to impose harsher
sentences on repeat offenders with prior qualifying felony
convictions or "strikes."38
"Serious" or "violent" felony
convictions qualify as prior strikes,39 whereas the "triggering"
felony conviction, or the principal offense, need not be violent. 40
Punishment increases with the number of strikes. 41 A second
29 Id. The California Supreme Court denied Andrade's petition without comment.
Id. Andrade raised several constitutional claims, including a violation of his Eighth
Amendment rights, which had previously been rejected by the California Court of
Appeal. Andrade, 270 F.3d at 750.
30 Id.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) permits persons "in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States" to fIle a writ of habeas corpus. 28
U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2002).
31
The district court's order consisted of only two sentences and simply adopted the
Magistrate's findings. Andrade, 270 F.3d at 750.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. Andrade initially fIled his appeal pro se, but the Ninth circuit appointed him
counsel and ordered supplemental briefing. Andrade, 270 F.3d at 750.
37 Id.; Career Criminal Punishment Act, CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(b) - (i), 1170.12
(West 2002).
38 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 747.
39 Id.
40 Id.
"Wobbler" offenses, those capable of being charged as either felonies or
misdemeanors constitute a felony for the purposes of the Three Strikes Law when
charged and sentenced as a felony. Id.
41
Id.
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strike requires the sentencing court to double the sentence the
defendant would have received and a third strike mandates a
minimum sentence of 25 years to life. 42

III. NINTH CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS
A. JURISDICTION
The first issue addressed by the Ninth Circuit was whether
the court had jurisdiction over Andrade's appea1. 43 A timely
notice of appeal warrants jurisdiction. 44 A notice of appeal
must be filed within thirty days after entry of the district court
judgment. 45 The district court may grant a time extension if
the moving party files the notice within the thirty day time
limit and shows excusable neglect or good cause. 46 Essentially,
the Ninth circuit distinguished, re-examined and overruled
precedent which held that a motion for extension of time may
not serve as a notice of appea1. 47 Although Andrade filed his
notice of appeal fifty days after entry of the district court
judgment, the court found that Andrade's motion for order
extending time to appeal, filed within thirty days of entry of
the district court judgment, served as "the functional
equivalent" of a notice of appea1. 48 Accordingly, the court
concluded that Andrade's appeal fell within their jurisdiction.49
B. DE NOVO REVIEW
In reviewing de novo the district court's decision to deny
Andrade's petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §2254,
the Ninth Circuit addressed whether the state court's decision
was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established federal law. 50 The Ninth Circuit is required
[d.
Andrade, 270 F.3d at 750.
44
Fed. R. App. P. 3(a).
45
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(a).
46 Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5)(a).
47 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 751 . 52.
48 [d. at 751.
49 [d.
50 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 753 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1) and Van Tran u. Lindsey
212 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000).). Based on the date Andrade fIled his petition, the
court reviewed his petition under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act,
42
43

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2002

5

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 7

100

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vol. 32:1

to make a de novo determination of what is clearly established
federal law. 51
The court explained that under the
'unreasonable application' standard, the court must also
determine whether the state court erred, and if so, whether any
error by the state court involved an unreasonable application of
clearly established law. 52 The court reviewed and applied
controlling Eighth Amendment authority and held that
Andrade's sentence was grossly disproportionate to his
offense. 53 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the
California Court of Appeal decision, which reached the opposite
result, was an unreasonable application of clearly established
of law. 54 The court reversed the district court judgment and
remanded with instructions to issue the writ of habeas corpus
if the district court did not re-sentence Andrade within sixty
days.55

C. EIGHTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
The Eighth Amendment protects persons from cruel and
unusual punishment. 56 Numerous United States Supreme
Court cases decided over the last two decades address the
constitutionality of life sentences imposed on non-violent
recidivists. The Ninth Circuit, in Andrade, followed the lead of
other circuits and applied the Harmelin u. Michigan 57 gross
proportionality test58 announced in Justice Kennedy's plurality
opinion. 59
Pub. L. No. 104 -132, 110 Stat. 1214 (Apr. 24, 1996), which requires application of the
'contrary to, or unreasonable application' standard. Id.
5l Id. at 753 (citing LaJoie u. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 668 (9th Cir. 2000».
52 Id. at 753 (citing Van Tran u. Lindsey 212 F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000».
53 Id. at 767.
MId.
55 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 767.
66 Id. at 753 - 54.
The Eight Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that there "shall not be ... cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment "applies against the States by virtue of
the Fourteenth Amendment." Andrade, 270 F.3d at 754 (citing Harmelin, 501 U.S. at
962.).
57 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
58 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 754. Justice Kennedy concluded that Eighth Amendment
analysis requires gross proportionality, rather than strict proportionality, between the
sentence and the crime. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting
Solem, 463 U.S. at 288).
59 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 753 - 754. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the opinion
written by Justice Kennedy, writing for himself and three other justices, constituted
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1. Review of United States Supreme Court Law
The Ninth Circuit reviewed the previous United States
Supreme Court decisions in Rummel v. Estelle 60 and Solem v.
Helm 61 to give meaning to Harmelin ~ gross proportionality
test. 62 In Rummel, the Supreme Court upheld a sentence of life
in prison with the possibility of parole for a three-time nonviolent recidivist convicted under Texas' habitual offender
statute. 63 Rummel's prior felony convictions included credit
card fraud to obtain goods or services totaling approximately
$80 and check forgery in the amount of $28.36. 64 Rummel's
third triggering offense was a conviction for obtaining $120.75
by false pretenses. 65 In Solem, the Supreme Court reversed a
sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole for a
seven-time non-violent recidivist. 66 The defendant's criminal
history consisted of three third degree burglary convictions, one
conviction for obtaining money under false pretenses, one
grand larceny conviction, and a conviction for driving while
intoxicated. 67 Defendant's seventh felony was for writing a "no
account" check for $100. 68 The Ninth Circuit outlined the
pertinent factors considered by the Supreme Court in Rummel
.and Solem. 69 Both the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court
emphasized the fact that Texas' recidivist statute at issue in
Rummel compelled separate convictions and sentences for each
felony, and allowed the prosecution to retain discretion to not

the narrowest grounds upon which a decision could be based. Id. Seven Justices
formed the plurality opinion by affirming the use of the proportionality test with
Justice Kennedy'S opinion forming the rule of Harmelin. Id. The Supreme Court in
Harmelin upheld a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole for
possession of more than 650 grams cocaine, even though the offense constituted the
defendant's first felony. Id.
60 445 U.S. 263 (1990).
61 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
62 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 754.
The "Eighth Amendment does not require strict
proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather it forbids only extreme sentences
that are 'grossly disproportionate' to the crime." Id. (citing Harmelin, 501 U.S. at
1001).
63 Rummel, 445 U.S. 263.
64 Id. at 265; Andrade 270 F.3d at 754 - 55.
65 Rummel, 445 U.S. at 266; Andrade, 270 F.3d at 755.
66 Solem, 463 U.S. at 277.
67 Id. at 280.
66 Id. at 281.
69 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 755.
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invoke the recidivist statute 70 in addition to the liberal nature
of the Texas' parole policy, under which Rummel would have
been eligible for parole in as few as twelve years.71 In Solem,
the Supreme Court set forth three specific objective guidelines
to determine gross proportionality under the Eighth
Amendment: "(1) the gravity of the offense and the harshness
of the penalty; (2) the sentences imposed on other criminals in
the same jurisdiction; and (3) the sentences imposed for
commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions."72 The
Supreme Court distinguished the life sentences in Rummel and
Solem by noting the more liberal parole policy at issue in
Rummel and the lack of any possibility of parole for the
defendant in Solem to invalidate Solem's sentence. 73
The Ninth Circuit next examined Justice Kennedy's
concurrence in Harmelin. 74 The concurring opinion in that
case, which relied heavily on Rummel and Solem,75 held that
the Eighth Amendment gross proportionality analysis could,
but did not, prohibit Harmelin's non-capital sentence. 76 The
Ninth Circuit agreed with Justice Kennedy's conclusion that
the second and third considerations of Solem, respectively, the
intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional factors, need not be
addressed by courts unless an examination of the fIrst factor
leads to an "inference of gross proportionality."77

See id.
See id. Texas' parole policy allowed Rummel to be eligible for parole in twelve
years. Rummel, 445 U.S at 280 . 81.
72 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 756.
73 Id; Solem, 463 U.S. at 292.
74 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 757.
76 Id. Justice Kennedy's concurrence recognized several common principles from
Rummel and Solem that helped illuminate the proportionality analysis, including:
(1) . .. substantial deference to legislative determinations of appropriate
punishments, (2) the Eighth Amendment does not require that legislatures adopt
any particular penological theory, . .. (3) divergences in theories of sentencing
and length of prison terms ... , (4) proportionality reviews should be informed by
objective factors and (5) the Eighth Amendment does not require strict
proportionality between crime and sentence but rather, it forbids only extreme
sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime.
Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
76 Id.
77 Id.
70

71
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2. Application of United States Supreme Court Law
In reviewing the facts of the Andrade case, the Ninth
Circuit applied Justice Kennedy's gross proportionality test 78
and found that an inference of gross disproportionality arose
when comparing the harshness of the punishment to the
relative lack of gravity of the crime. 79

a. Comparison of Punishment and Crime
~.

Harshness of the Penalty

The trial court sentenced Andrade to two consecutive
twenty-five years to life sentences. 80 The Ninth Circuit noted
that the Three Strikes Law eliminates judicial discretion and
requires the trial judge to impose consecutive rather than
concurrent sentences. 81 Additionally, the court noted that,
unlike sentences imposed under other California laws, good
behavior or working credit would not minimize Andrade's
sentence. 82 The Ninth Circuit likened Andrade's sentences to
those in Solem and Harmelin and distinguished Andrade's
sentence from the sentence in Rummel. 83
The court
distinguished the sentence imposed in Rummel primarily based
on the fact that Rummel's first and second felonies were
adjudicated in two separate proceedings, whereas Andrade's
first and second strike were adjudicated in a single judicial
proceeding more than ten years prior to the current offense. 84
Andrade would not be eligible for parole until he is 87 years
old, therefore, the court concluded it was more likely than not
that he would spend the rest of his life in prison without ever
becoming eligible for parole for the commission of two petty
offenses with a prior. 85

Id. at 758.
Andrade, 270 F.3d at 757.
80 Id. at 758.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 759.
84 Id. at 760.
85 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 759.
The court also noted that because Rummel was
eligible for parole in twelve years, Andrade would serve more than four time the length
of Rummel's sentence before he would become eligible for parole. Id. at 758.
78
79
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u. Gravity of the Offense
Before analyzing the gravity of the offense, the court
recognized the policy rationale underlying harsher sentences
for recidivists while emphasizing that the increased sentence is
harsher punishment for the triggering felony.86 The Ninth
Circuit found the facts of the present case to be most analogous
to the facts in Solem. 87 The court held that both Andrade's and
Solem's triggering offenses were for petty theft, were nonviolent, and involved relatively small amounts of money.88 In
contrast, Harmelin's principal offense was of a more serious
and violent nature. 89 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit noted
that defendants prosecuted for petty theft are usually charged
with a misdemeanor rather than a felony.90 In the present
case, had the petty theft offense been Andrade's first, the
punishment for the conviction could not exceed six months of
imprisonment and a $1,000 fine. 91 Instead, the prosecutor
opted to charge Andrade's petty theft offenses as felonies
rather than misdemeanors,92 and also, utilized prosecutorial
discretion to count the elevated felonies as Andrade's third and
fourth strikes. 93 Essentially, the court concluded that the
Three Strikes Law allowed Andrade's offenses to be double
counted, by first enhancing his misdemeanor offenses to
felonies and then enhancing them again to third and fourth
strikes. 94 The Ninth Circuit explained that in considering the
gravity of the offense, the nature of the principal offense is an
important factor and that recidivism alone does not create a
presumption of constitutionality for the enhanced sentence. 95
86 Id. at 759. "A 'State is justified in punishing a recidivist more severely than it
punishes a first offender:" Id. (citing Solem, 463 U.S. at 296.).
87 Id. at 761.
88 Id. at 759.
89 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 759. The court adopted the reasoning of Justice Kennedy's
concurrence in Harmelin, which emphasized the large quantity of drugs possessed by
the defendant and the consequences of such possession on society. Id.
90 Id. at 760.
91
CAL. PENAL CODE § 490 (West 2002).
92 The California Penal Code authorizes prosecutorial discretion in charging
defendants with felonies or misdemeanors if the current offense is petty theft offense
with a prior petty offense conviction. CAL. PENAL CODE § 666 (West 2002).
93 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 761.
94
Id. at 760.
95 Id.
The Ninth Circuit cited the holding in Solem, which invalidated a life
sentence of a seven-time non-violent recidivist, as support for this proposition. Id.
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iii. Inference of Gross Disproportionality
In finding an inference of gross disproportionality between
the harshness of the crime and the gravity of the offense, the
court found Andrade's case most similar to Solem's for three
primary reasons. 96 The court stated that Andrade's and
Solem's principal offenses were non-violent, Andrade's first and
second strike were prosecuted in a single judicial proceeding,
more than ten years prior to the current sentencing and
Andrade's offense were double-counted based on an odd 'quirk'
in California law allowing the prosecutor to charge Andrade's
petty thefts with a prior as felonies and enabling those felonies
to count as Andrade's third and fourth strikes. 97 In light of the
court's finding that an inference of gross disproportionality
existed, the court went on to examine the remaining factors of
Justice Kennedy's Harmelin test.
b. Intrajurisdictional Comparison
The Ninth Circuit explained that an intrajurisdictional
comparison involves examining the suspect sentence in
comparison to sentences imposed on other criminals in the
same jurisdiction. 98 The court restated that a first offense
petty theft conviction in California is punishable by up to six
months imprisonment and a $1,000 fine if prosecuted as a
misdemeanor in California. 99 The same offense, if charged as a
felony, is punishable by up to three years in prison. lOO The
court concluded that under the California Penal Code,
Andrade's maximum sentence would have been six years. lOl
The court further noted that the California Penal Code
only punishes a limited number of crimes with sentences
harsher than Andrade's,102 while the punishments for other
Id. at 761.
Id. The Ninth Circuit found that the offenses were double-counted since that the
prosecutor charged Andrade's petty theft offenses as felonies rather misdemeanors and
in addition, the prosecutor used the elevated felony convictions as Andrade's third and
fourth strikes. Andrade, 270 F.3d at 761.
99 Id.
99 Id.; CAL. PENAL CODE § 490 (West 2002).
I()()
Andrade, 270 F.3d at 761. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 18, 666 (West 2002).
101 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 761.
102 Id. at 761 - 62. See e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190 (fIrst-degree murder punishable
by death, life without parole, or 25 years to life); CAL. PENAL CODE § 209 (kidnapping
96

97
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serious and violent crimes are much less severe. 103 The State
attempted to persuade the court to compare Andrade's
sentence with the sentences of other non-violent recidivists
convicted under the Three Strikes Law.1 04 However, the court
summarily rejected this argument and stated that such an
approach would require "justifying the constitutionally-suspect
application of a statute by pointing to other applications of the
same statute."105 The court further commented that even if
such an approach were adopted, Andrade's sentence was twice
as long as other non-violent recidivists sentenced under
California's Three Strikes Law.106 Thus, the court determined
that Andrade's sentence was grossly disproportionate when
compared to sentences prescribed by California law for most
violent crimes, as well as sentences imposed upon other
defendants sentenced under the Three Strikes Law. 107
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the
intrajurisdictional comparison suggested that Andrade's
sentence was grossly disproportionate
to his crimes in
lOB
violation of the Eighth Amendment.
c. Interjurisdictional Comparison
The Ninth Circuit observed that many states have statutes
that authorize more severe sentences for repeat offenders. 109
However, the court noted that Andrade's petty theft with a
prior offense would trigger the recidivist statute in only four
states: Rhode Island, West Virginia, Texas, and Louisiana.1 lo
under certain circumstances punishable by life without parole); CAL. PENAL CODE §§
218 and 219 (train wrecking or derailing punishable by life without parole or death);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 12310 (unlawful explosion causing death, mayhem, or great bodily
injury punishable by life without parole).
103 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 762.
See e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190 (second·degree
murder generally punishable by 15 years to life); id. § 193 (voluntary manslaughter
punishable by up to eleven years); CAL. PENAL CODE § 264 (rape punishable by up to
eight years); CAL. PENAL CODE § 288 (sexual assault punishable by up to 8 years).
104 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 762.
105

[d.

106

Id.

107

[d.

Id.
Id. at 762 . 63. Twenty·five states have recidivist statutes comparable to
California's Three Strikes Law. Andrade, 270 F.3d at 762 (citing John Clark et ai.,
"Three Strikes and You re Out ~ A Review of State Legislation in National Institute of
Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, Research in Brief at 1 (1997).
110 Id. at 763.
108

109
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The Ninth Circuit concluded that based on the states' various
statutory provisions, Andrade's sentence would not be as
severe in those states as the sentence imposed under California
law based on his two prior strikes for residential burglary.1l1
As the single exception, the court found that if Andrade's other
prior offenses were considered, even though these offenses were
not used to calculate his current sentence, Louisiana law could
impose a comparable sentence.1 12 Notably, even such a
hypothetical conviction would be subject to challenge under
Louisiana's state constitution. u3
L.

Rhode Island

The court found that if Andrade had been sentenced in
Rhode Island, he could not receive a similarly harsh sentence
in Rhode Island for two reasons. First, Rhode Island law
permits the imposition of an additional twenty-five years in
prison for a three-time felon. u4 However, Andrade's petty theft
offense would be insufficient to trigger the statutory provision
since theft of goods valued under $100 is not a felony in Rhode
Island, even if the defendant has a prior petty theft
conviction. u5 Second, the habitual offender statute in Rhode
Island requires two or more separate convictions to trigger the
imposition of enhanced punishment for recidivists. 116 Thus, the
court concluded that Andrade's criminal history would not
trigger harsher punishment in Rhode Island because the
principal offenses were individually valued at less than $100
and Andrade's first and second strikes were adjudicated in a
single proceeding. ll7 The court further noted that unlike
California's Three Strikes Law, Rhode Island's habitual
offender statute grants judicial discretion in setting the
number of years that must be served before a defendant is
eligible for parole, whereas California law requires mandatory
minimum sentencing. us Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded
III
112
113

114
115

116
l17
118

[d. at 762.
[d.
[d.

[d. See also R.1. GEN. LAws § 12-19-21 (2001).
Andrade, 270 F.3d at 762. See also R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-14-20(d) (2001).
Andrade, 270 F.3d at 762.
[d.
[d.
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that sentencing under Rhode Island law would be less severe
than under California law. 119
H.

West Virginia

The Ninth Circuit found that while Andrade's principal
offense would trigger the West Virginia recidivist statute,
Andrade could not receive a life sentence based on a state
supreme court holding that life sentences for non-violent
recidivists violate the state constitution.1 20
iii. Texas

Under Texas law, all petty theft offenses are charged as
misdemeanors unless the defendant has two prior theft
convictions, then the subsequent petty theft offense may be
charged as a felony.121 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that if only
Andrade's 1990 petty theft conviction was considered, as the
state courts did, then Andrade's current offenses, if committed
in Texas, could only be prosecuted as a misdemeanor with a
maximum punishment of six months in prison and a $2,000
flne. 122 Texas' habitual offender law is not triggered by
misdemeanor offenses, therefore, Andrade's current offenses
would not trigger Texas' recidivist statute.1 23 However, the
court noted that if both Andrade's 1982 and 1990 misdemeanor
petty theft convictions were counted, then Andrade's offenses
would be "state jail felonies"124 with a maximum penalty of
forty years imprisonment 125 if the court sentenced him to two
consecutive terms. Furthermore, the court recognized the
liberal nature of Texas' parole policy and found that Andrade
could be eligible for parole in ten years or less. 126 In any case,

Id.
Id. See State v. Deal, 178 W.Va. 142 (1987).
121 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 764; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 31.03(e)(4)(D) and 12.42
(Vernon 2001).
122 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 764.
123
Id.
124
Id; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(e)(4)(D) (Vernon 2001).
125 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 764.
126
Id. Good·time credit may apply to Andrade's sentence, thus, making him eligible
for parole in a shorter amount of time. Id.
119
120
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Andrade's sentence would be far less under Texas' recidivist
statute. 127

iv. Louisiana
Louisiana law, at the time the California courts considered
Andrade's appeal, 128 would have permitted a sentence
comparable to 50 years to life.1 29 This sentence could have
been possible only if, in addition to the convictions considered
by the California courts in sentencing Andrade, his 1982 petty
theft conviction and his two federal felonies for marijuana
transportation were considered during sentencing. 130 Under
Louisiana's recidivist statute, a fourth or subsequent felony
conviction is punished with a minimum of twenty years in
prison without the possibility of parole. 131
The Ninth Circuit analyzed Andrade's criminal history
under Louisiana law.132 The court found that Louisiana law
would treat Andrade's three counts of burglary as a single prior
felony133 and count his federal marijuana convictions as his
second and third strikes. 134 The Ninth Circuit concluded that
Andrade could receive two twenty year terms, or forty years if
sentenced consecutively,135 However, the Ninth Circuit noted
that in Louisiana, unlike California, a sentence similar to the
Id.
Id. In 2001, Louisiana amended it's recidivist statute requiring, inter alia, that
to count as a third or fourth strike the triggering offense be "a crime of violence, a sex
offense, or ... a violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law
punishable by imprisonment for ten years or more or any other crimes punishable by
imprisonment for twelve years or more." 2001 La. Sess. Law. Servo 403 (West).
Andrade's two counts of petty theft with priors are punishable each by a maximum of
two years in prison. Thus, his current convictions could only count as second strikes
and carry a maximum punishment of eight years, or twice the maximum sentence for
each petty with a prior. Andrade, 270 F.3d at 764.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 765; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:529.1(A)(I)(c)(i), (G) (West 2002).
132 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 764.
133 Id. at 765. Louisiana consistently interpreted the recidivist statute as having a
'sequential requirement.' See State v. Corry, 601 So.2d 142, 147 (La. Ct. App. 1992)
(applying the sequential requirement to three counts of burglary entered on the same
day).
134 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 765; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:529.1 (A)(l) (West 2002).
135 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 765.
The court noted that Andrade could receive a life
sentence without the possibility of parole if either of his federal marijuana felonies
were punishable under the Louisiana Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law
by more than five years. Id; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:529.1 (A)(l)(c)(iii) (West 20(2).
,127
128
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one imposed upon Andrade would be subject to the possibility
of a successful constitutional challenge under the Louisiana
state constitution. 136
The court reasoned that the possibility that Andrade could
receive a comparable sentence in only one other state, and even
then only if convictions not considered in the California
sentencing were considered, was not enough to overcome the
conclusion that Andrade's sentence was grossly disproportional
under the Eighth Amendment. 137 Accordingly, the court held
Andrade's sentence violated the Eighth Amendment since it
met the Harmelin guidelines: (1) gross disproportionality when
compared to his current convictions and his criminal history;
(2) a sentence harsher than the punishment prescribed for
most violent crimes in California and other sentences imposed
under the Three Strikes Law; and (3) only one other state
would have imposed a similarly harsh sentence. 13S

3. Decision of the California Court of Appeal
The Ninth Circuit stated relief may only be granted if the
state court's decision is "contrary to, or involves an
unreasonable application of Federal law."139 The court held
that Eighth Amendment case law, as applied to non-violent
recidivists, was well-settled at the time of the California Court
of Appeal's decision in 1997. 140 Specifically, the court found
Harmelin controlling, while Rummel and Solem were
instructive as to Harmelin's application,141 The California
Court of Appeal had relied on Rummel, and had questioned the
validity of Solem in light of Harmelin, in deciding to uphold
Andrade's sentence. 142 The Ninth Circuit held that the state
136 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 765. A Louisiana court found a life sentence under the
recidivist statute excessive for a defendant convicted of "misappropriating or taking
over $500" when his prior crimes included two counts of theft (one under and one over
$100), several counts of issuing worthless checks, check forgery and simple robbery.
Id.; State v. Hayes, 739 So. 2d 301 (La. Ct. App. 1999).
137 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 765.
138 Id. at 765 - 66.
139 Id. at 766. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, the Ninth
circuit's "mere disagreement" with the state court would not be enough to grant relief.
Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2002).
140 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 766.
141 Id.
142
Id.
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court's analysis, which ignored the holding in Solem, was an
unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court
precedent since only two justices in Harmelin agreed to
overrule Solem. 143
While the circumstances surrounding
Andrade's sentence are comparable to the sentences in both
Rummel and Solem, the Ninth Circuit found Andrade's
sentence most analogous to Solem. 144 Accordingly, because the
state court did not address the importance of Solem's impact on
the present case, the California Court of Appeal's decision
constituted clear error and was an unreasonable application of
federallaw.1 45
D. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit did not invalidate California's Three
Strikes Law, but instead limited their holding to the unique
facts of Andrade's case. 146 Since Andrade's sentence was
grossly disproportionate to his offenses, and the California
Court of Appeal rendered a decision that involved an
unreasonable application of federal law, the Ninth Circuit
reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case
for the district court to re-sentence Andrade within sixty days
or issue the writ of habeas corpus if it failed to do so.1 47

E. JUSTICE SNEED'S CONCURRENCE AND DISSENT
Justice Sneed concurred with the majority's holding that
Andrade's motion for extension of time served as the functional
equivalent of a notice of appeal.1 48 However, the heart of
Justice Sneed's dissent focused on his disagreement with the
majority's conclusion that Andrade's sentence was invalid
under the Eighth Amendment. 149 Justice Sneed emphasized
how infrequently sentences have historically been invalidated
under the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment

146

Id.
Id.
Id.
Andrade, 270 F.3d at 767.

147

Id.

143
144
145

148
149

Id.
Id.
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clause 150 and stated that Ninth Circuit precedent supported
invalidating a defendant's sentence under the Eighth
Amendment only if the sentence exceeded statutory limits.151
Justice Sneed found that an analysis under Harmelin
required an affirmation of Andrade's sentence based on the
principles underlying that decision as enunciated by Justice
Kennedy. 152 Justice Sneed emphasized Justice Kennedy's first
and second principles, respectively, substantial deference to the
legislature and the Eight Amendment's lack of a requirement
to adopt a specllic penalogical theory. 153 Based on these
principles, Justice Sneed believed the court should grant great
deference to the voting public who, by a majority of over
seventy-one percent, approved California's Three Strikes Law,
as well as to the state legislature, which created the sentences
under the Three Strikes Law. 154 Furthermore, based on the
idea that states have varying theories of sentencing,155 Justice
Kennedy's third principle, Justice Sneed declared that each
state is entitled to it's own theories of sentencing. 156 The fourth
principle requires maximum use of objective factors, which may
include distinguishing between capital sentences and sentences
for terms of years. 157
Justice Sneed distinguished Andrade's sentence from other
constitutionally suspect sentences since it provides for a terms
of years as opposed to death. 158 Justice Sneed argued that the
Harmelin court concluded that a rational basis existed for
Harmelin's sentence based on these four principles,159
Accordingly, Justice Sneed concluded that an equally rational
basis existed to uphold Andrade's sentence based on the
purpose of recidivist statutes, namely to inflict harsher
Id. at 767 - 68.
Id. at 768.
152 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 768. The four principles are: "(1) ... substantial deference
to legislative determinations of appropriate punishments, (2) the Eighth Amendment
does not require that legislatures adopt any particular penological theory, . .. (3)
divergences in theories of sentencing and length of prison terms ... , (4) proportionality
reviews should be informed by objective factors." (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted). Id.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155' Id.
156 Id. at 769.
157 Andrade, 270 F.3d. at 770.
158 Id. at 769.
159 Id.
160
151
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punishments on repeat offenders.1 60 Justice Sneed complained
that the majority ignored Harmelin's underlying principles and
emphasized that an Eighth Amendment analysis of a sentence
imposed on non-violent recidivist should be guided by deference
to the state's electorate and the discretion of the fIfty states. 161
Justice Sneed also commented that application of Justice
Kennedy's principles, rather than his three-part test, will not
lead to excessive judicial discretion. 162 Upon examining the
facts of Andrade's case, Justice Sneed determined that two
terms of twenty-five years to life, given Andrade's entire
criminal history, created a rational basis upon which to justify
Andrade's sentence. 163 Therefore, he concluded that Andrade's
sentence was not grossly disproportionate, and thus was
neither clearly erroneous nor an unreasonable application of
clearly established United States Supreme Court law. 164

IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION
When a defendant seeks relief from a state court decision
using a habeas corpus petition, the United States Court of
Appeals may only grant relief if the state court decision was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established United States Supreme Court law. 165 The Court of
Appeals will fInd an unreasonable application within the
meaning of the habeas statute only if the state court clearly
erred. 166 Harmelin declared, and Andrade affIrmed, that a
challenge to a state court sentence brought under the cruel and
unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment requires
an analysis of gross proportionality between the sentence and

Id.
Id. at 770.
162 Id.
Justice Sneed cited two Circuit Court of Appeals' cases as support for his
position; Bocian v. Godinez (7th Cir. 1996) 101 F.3d 465,472 (court upheld defendant's
sentence and concluded sentence as consistent with federal law); McGruder v. Puckett
160
161

(5th Cir. 1992) 954 F.2d 313 (court upheld defendant's life sentence without the
possibility of parole where the triggering offense was auto burglary). Andrade, 270
F.3d at 770.
163 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 772.

Id.
Id. at 753; Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)
(2002); Van Tran, 212 F.3d at 1149.
166 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 753; Van Tran, 212 F.3d at 1153 - 54.
164

165
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the crime. 167 A gross proportionality analysis must compare
the harshness of the punishment to the gravity of the
offense. 168 If an inference of gross disproportionality is found,
then the reviewing court must engage in both an
intrajurisditional analysis, comparing the sentence to other
punishments imposed in the same jurisdiction as the
sentencing court, and an interjurisdictional analysis,
comparing it to sentences imposed in other jurisdictions.1 69
The Andrade court's narrow decision is limited to the
specific circumstances of Andrade's case and holds that a
sentence of fifty years to life under California's Three Strikes
Law, based on a triggering offense for petty theft of goods and
services valued at $153.54 with two priors was so grossly
proportionate as to violate the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition· against cruel and unusual punishment. 170
However, the Ninth Circuit sent a clear message to California's
sentencing courts that excessive punishment of a non-violent
recidivist sentenced under the Three Strikes Law is not
immune from reversal. Nonetheless, several California courts
of appeal have chosen not to follow the holding in Andrade
claiming that either the Ninth circuit erred in it's reasoning
and analysis l7l or the state is not bound by lower federal court
decisions,172 while other California courts of appeal
distinguished Andrade based on the facts.173 While some
California courts have questioned the validity of the Andrade
court's analysis, its implication on the future application of the
Three Strikes Law to non-violent recidivists is still pending in
167

166
169
170

Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001; Andrade, 270 F.3d 743.
Andrade, 270 F.3d 757.
Andrade, 270 F.3d 761; Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005.
Andrade, 270 F.3d at 766.

People v. Rogers, No. D034303, 2002 WL 27609, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 09,
2002) (Disagreed with the Andrade court's interpretation of the federal law and upheld
defendant's sentence of 25 years to life with the possibility of parole for firearm
possession by a felon plus one year each for two prison priors, in addition to previous
convictions for burglary and robbery, two prior serious felonies within the meaning of
the Three Strikes Law). (CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 211, 459, 667.5 subd. (b), 667 subd. (b)(i).); People v. Harris, No. B147736, 2001 WL 1558761, *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 07, 2001)
(affirmed defendant's sentence of 25 years to life for petty theft with a prior).
172 People v. Camarena, No. D036775, 2001 WL 1663234 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 31,
2001) (court found Andrade factually apposite and not binding).
173 People v. Moore, No. F037872, 2002 WL 57418 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2002);
People v. Archie, No. B145323, 2001 WL 1649290 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 26, 2001); People
v. Mendoza, No. C033884, 2001 WL 1470377 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2001).
171
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light of the United States Supreme Court's decision to grant
the State's writ of certiorari,174
Renee R. Ross*

174 Andrade v. Attorney General, 270 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 2001), Cert. granted,
Lockyer v. Andrade, No. 01·1127, 2002 WL 204945 (U.S. Apr. 1,2002). The case is set
for oral argument in tandem with, Ewing v. California, No. 01·6978, 2002 WL 480176
(U.S. Apr. 1, 2002). Andrade, 2002 WL 204945.
* J.D. candidate, 2002. I would like to thank my family and friends for their endless
support and understanding. I am especially grateful to my two editors: Crystal and
Aunt Shelli. Thank you!
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